The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic is a result of its own self-interest. The country's approach to international relations is motivated by the need to defend Iran's Islamic theocracy from external threats. That strategy can occasionally appear aggressive or pragmatist. There is also a sectarian perspective.
Iran has depended on a policy of establishing partnerships with nonstate groups to help advance its strategic goals because of its relative estrangement from its neighbours since the 1979 revolution. Iran's assistance for Shia organisations has most enraged its neighbours, despite the fact that it also backs Sunni organisations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.
Iran has benefited strategically from this strategy, which is frequently combined with the unofficial aim of exporting the revolution, but it has also cemented impressions of its confessional prejudice.
Since the 1979 revolution, religion has been integral to Iranian decision-making. Since the 1979 revolution, religion has been critical to Iranian decision-making.
Iran's geopolitical strategy in the Middle East has since 2003 been concentrated on supporting Shia armed organisations, despite its ambitions to establish a pan-Islamic state. Iran has considerably increased its regional influence by working through these nonstate clients, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
Although they do not mandate it, Iran's religious identity and beliefs influence how it views its interactions with other countries. Iran's interactions with nonstate organisations are more important than those with other states, where religion is less important.
It hides more about Iran's actions than it exposes when its foreign policy is reduced to its essence as sectarian. However, Iran's regional conduct has changed as the Middle East has become increasingly sectarian following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Arab Spring.
The most obvious manifestations of Iran's sectarian behaviour are found in its efforts in Syria. Thousands of Shia terrorists who are not Syrian have joined forces with Iran to support Bashar al-government. Assad's Iran's military and its affiliates cast their participation in that conflict in unmistakably confessional terms, despite the fact that Iranian leaders emphasise the legitimacy of the action in Syria and reject any sectarian purpose.
It is impossible to separate Iran's regional activity from the rise of Sunni sectarianism in the Middle East. Iran holds its Sunni neighbours responsible for the rise of Sunni extremism, and as a result, feels obligated to increase its support for its own Shia friends.
Iran's nationwide protests in January 2018 served as a reminder of the nation's erratic domestic politics, but the Islamic Republic's foreign policy and national security priorities have been relatively stable since the 1979 revolution. The four pillars of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy—Pan-Shia, Pan-Islamist, anti-West, and anti-Israel—have remained steadfastly intact despite efforts by a number of Iranian presidents, including the country's current president, Hassan Rouhani.
Large segments of Iran's populace want to interact with the rest of the world despite the nation's isolation. But before they can, Iran's leaders must respond to the query presented to them by the late Henry Kissinger: Is Iran a nation or a cause? It is alarmingly both at the moment and will stay that way until the country's decision-makers understand that a nation that ignores its economic requirements is destined to fall.
Iran has a lot of untapped economic
potential. If it were to properly utilise its abundant natural and people
resources, it might become a regional economic powerhouse. Contrary to what
Iran's leaders believe, a prosperous and happy Iranian citizenry that is
engaged with the outside world would improve the nation's security.
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