Turkey’s threat to sabotage Swedish and Finnish NATO membership re-raises the Kurdish question

 

In the aftermath of Russia's war on Ukraine, Turkey's opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has put the Kurdish question on the world scene. President Recep Tayyip Erdoan is trying to take advantage of the need to strengthen Western deterrence by putting more pressure on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

The insurgent group has been fighting the Turkish state for five decades to achieve greater rights for Turkey's Kurds, but it has risen quickly since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and Washington's decision in 2014 to work with its sister organization to destroy the Islamic State group (IS).

For decades, the PKK has been an important part of Turkey's relationship with Europe and the United States, and Erdoan has launched several military campaigns into Syria's northeast to suppress the autonomous enclave created by the PKK's sister organization, the Peoples' Protection Units (YPG), during the civil war.

While Turkey may be exploiting the Nordic NATO admission discussions to obtain Western support for a new campaign, it has a history of conducting cross-border raids against the PKK, and Erdoan may also be attempting to secure other concessions, such as the relaxation of embargoes on Turkey's weapons industry.

However, Ankara's objection to Swedish and Finnish membership is based on their refusal to repatriate PKK militants and followers of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen (whom Ankara accuses of organizing a 2016 coup attempt). The second-order effects of the battle against IS, as well as the proximity of the Kurdish conundrum to U.S. and European security interests, necessitate a reprioritization of the issue in the West, given the tectonic shifts in the global security order since Russia invaded Ukraine.

RELATIONSHIPS DRIVEN BY CRISIS

Turkey's fight with the PKK has strained relations with the United States and its European allies for years. Since the Arab revolutions of 2011 and the formation of IS, relations have been in flux, with shifting fault lines in the Middle East either enhancing or upsetting relations.

The fragile truce was upended in 2015 by the YPG's ascendancy in Syria, its refusal to prioritize the fall of the Assad regime, and deep-seated animosities, despite the fact that the 2013 peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK increased hopes of a sustainable settlement. As a result, an internal conflict that has taken on various global dimensions and resulted in numerous humanitarian catastrophes has resurfaced.

Ankara has questioned Europe's commitment to resolving its security concerns for decades. In the 1990s, Greece and Italy offered asylum to the PKK's imprisoned founder and leader, Abdullah calan, and the PKK built a vast infrastructure, especially in Sweden, that allowed it to mobilize supporters and resources across Europe and in Turkey.

European officials hoped to use Turkey's EU membership process to improve the country's human rights record, but talks have been deadlocked for almost a decade, and both parties have practically given up.

In addition to helping the YPG, the US has enraged Erdoan by refusing to extradite Gülen, who is based in Pennsylvania, and by imposing tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum after an agreement to release pastor Andrew Brunson broke through in 2018. By purchasing Russian air defense systems, Ankara harmed US-Turkey relations, prompting Washington to impose sanctions on Turkey.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPE?

Because of Washington's preoccupation with Russia, China, and Iran, as well as Erdoan's combative approach to the West and widespread frustration with Turkey's foreign policy, it's difficult to see a political climate that would allow a proactive US effort to improve relations with Turkey –– even if the Biden administration will eventually have to make concessions to Ankara to secure support for NATO expansion.

However, this could be the time for Europe to mend its strategic rifts. Although other European countries, such as France, have supported the YPG, sentiments of US treachery in Turkey are more widespread and have built and crystallized over the course of a decade of turmoil since the Arab upheavals of 2011. Turkey is confronted with a unique set of dynamics in Europe.

The EU is by far Turkey's most important commercial partner: in 2020, the EU accounted for 33.4 percent of Turkey's imports and 41.3 percent of the country's exports. The total value of trade between the EU and Turkey in that year was €132.4 billion. As a result, there are limitations to how low Turkey-EU relations can fall, especially given the Turkish economy's severe difficulties.

While 58 percent of Turks believe the United States is the greatest threat to Turkey, 60 percent favor tighter connections with the EU, and Turks believe the EU's effectiveness in resolving global issues is more likely to deliver positive outcomes for humanity. Such dynamics could enable Europe to de-escalate NATO tensions and address worries about the PKK's future relationship with the US-led anti-IS alliance, which includes a number of European countries.

POLICIES INTEGRATED

As Turkey prepares for elections in 2023, the West must participate within the constraints of the country's political landscape. There will be little room to discuss Turkey's role as a problematic NATO ally or Erdoan's combative participation, and there will be no room to restart the PKK peace process.

The United States and Europe might wait until after the elections to resolve their tumultuous relationship with Ankara, but it assumes Erdoan's defeat and a quick shift in Turkish foreign policy. Alternatively, the United States and Europe might begin to consider how to de-escalate the YPG problem and adopt much-needed confidence-building measures that balance the West's reliance on Kurdish fighters against IS with Turkey's security concerns.

That will necessitate Europe taking the lead in forming a task force with personnel with experience implementing conflict resolution mechanisms, such as ceasefires and peacekeeping, power-sharing formulas, and revenue-sharing frameworks, in coordination with Turkey and the US, which will be critical in light of Washington's decision to allow foreign investment in Syria's northeast.

It might send a message to Ankara that the West is paying attention to its concerns, while simultaneously providing a forum for all parties in the autonomous enclave to reach mutually beneficial agreements.